Written by Hanzhong Bai,  Edited by Charlotte Pugsley and Daniele Guido.

In Part 1 of the story we discussed the birth of Spinraza and its market access in
China. Here in Part 2, we will continue the story on the competitive landscape of
SMA drugs and Biogen’s revenue challenges in 2021.

Read Part 1 of the story here: Behind Spinraza's 95% price drop in China: desperate or pre-emptive? Part 1.

Challengers on the rise

Despite a suboptimal performance in China, Spinraza still leveraged its market
exclusivity to establish significant presence in the global SMA market, with its annual
revenues hitting a peak of US$2,097M in 2019 (1). However, this “monopoly” was
brought to an end by Novartis’ launch of Zolgensma in 2019 and Roche’s launch of
Evrysdi in 2020.


Using viral vectors to deliver a functional copy of the SMN1 gene (Read Part 1 of the
story for the function of SMN1 gene in SMA), Zolgensma was the first gene therapy
approved by the FDA and treats SMA once and for all (2). In contrast, both Spinraza
and Evrysdi use small molecules to correct the splicing of the SMN2 gene and
require life-long use (3, 4). With great power comes a great price, and Zolgensma
came with a hefty one, costing over US$2M for the single-dose injection (2019 list
price) (5). It is currently still the most expensive single-dose drug in the world. As a
result, sales of Zolgensma heavily relied on insurance or national payer
reimbursement schemes, instead of out-of-pocket payments by patients, and
experienced reimbursement hurdles in several markets due to its price (6). On the other hand, Evrysdi has a more flexible pricing model than Spinraza that
allows patients to be charged per kilogram of body weight (7). Roche estimates that
the 1st-year treatment of Evrysdi would cost US$100k for new-borns and US$340k
for toddlers, which is considerably cheaper than Spinraza’s universal US$600k
treatment plan (7, 26). Aside from the visibly lower prices, Evrysdi is taken orally
whereas Spinraza has to be administered by intrathecal injection (i.e. penetrating of
spinal cords), limiting the administration process to be done by trained staff at well-
equipped medical centres(3,4). Within 14 months of its launch, Evrysdi had become
the most prescribed SMA drug in the US, snatching US$221M revenues and about
20% of the total market share in 2021 Q4 (8, 9).


The full-throttle offensive by Evrysdi and Zolgensma has forced Spinraza to retreat.
In the US, Spinraza’s sales have been steadily dropping since 2019 Q4, and its
quarterly revenue has declined to US$150M by 2021 Q4, representing a 38%
decrease from its peak (1, 10). In addition, the majority (69%) of Spinraza's revenue
came from markets outside the US, where it still enjoyed a first-mover
advantage (10). With Spinraza’s key patents scheduled to expire in 2027, little time is
left for Biogen to capitalise on Spinraza before generics entry (11). In Biogen's 2020
Q4 earnings update, the company indicated an objective to expand to untapped
markets in order to drive sales (12). And where is the biggest SMA market outside
the US? I think we all know the answer at this point - the Chinese market.

Trouble on the Inside

On top of competition intensifying on the outside, Biogen is plagued with internal
conflicts   too.   The   multinational   corporation   is   known   for   its  strong   presence   in
neurodegenerative diseases. Multiple sclerosis (MS) is Biogen's particular forte, with
6 drugs in its portfolio (12). Tecfidera was their best-selling MS drug and achieved
US$3,841 M revenue in 2020, representing 28.9% of Biogen’s annual total revenue.
However, things took a turn in June 2020, when the U.S. District Court in West
Virginia   ruled   Tecfidera’s   patent  invalid.   The   generic   pharmaceuticals   company
Mylan   took   full   advantage   of   this   ruling   and   flooded   the   market   with   cheaper
alternatives (13).  As a result, Tecfidera’s revenue shrank by a staggering 49% in
2021 (10).


In   parallel,   Biogen's   long-awaited   Alzheimer's   disease   drug   Aduhelm   provoked
massive controversies in June 2021 as the US FDA approved the drug, despite an
absence of strong evidence of clinical efficacy (14).  Even the FDA’s own advisory
panel voted ten to zero against the drug, and the investigation of inappropriate
interactions between Biogen and FDA officials is ongoing (15, 16).  To date, Biogen
has yet to prove that Aduhelm works for Alzheimer’s disease, and the drug’s latest
update in March 2022 showed opposed results from the previous EMERGE and
ENGAGE trials, which only raised more questions about the drug's actual medical
benefit (17).  All  these  controversies  have  negatively impacted  Aduhelm's market
performance, which is reflected in the drug’s abysmal sales of US$3 M in 2021 and
Medicare’s recent decision to limit Aduhelm coverage to patients in trials only (10, 18).
These factors have together resulted in a drastic 18% drop in Biogen’s revenue in
2021, which is ~3 times higher than the decline seen in 2020 (10). As their second
most profitable drug, accounting for 17% of total revenues in 2021, Spinraza carried
a heavy weight to boost Biogen’s revenue streams.


On   Dec   3rd   2021,   China’s  National   Healthcare   Security   Administration   (NHSA)
published the 2021 National Reimbursement Drug List. Among those included was
Spinraza, at a historically low price of CNY33,000 per dose, a 95% price drop from
its list price of CNY700,000 (19).  By sacrificing profit margins and risking potential
repercussions from other markets, Spinraza gained government reimbursement that
will supposedly grant unparalleled competitive advantage. But the question lingers
on everyone’s mind: is the gain really worth the sacrifice?


Outlook for Spinraza: China vs. the World

When Spinraza was first introduced to the market in 2017, it checked all the boxes
for premium pricing: unprecedented medical efficacy, no competitors on the market
and a group of long-suffering customers willing to pay exorbitant prices. This worked
in   many   wealthy   countries,   and   by   2019   Biogen   had   successfully   negotiated
reimbursed patient access of Spinraza in 38 countries/regions worldwide, most of
which are in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region (20). However, the same playbook
didn’t work out in China, and the reason is twofold:

  • First, China is still a developing country whose GDP per capita (US$ 10,434;
    2020) is only a quarter of that of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members (US$ 38,218; 2020) (21), which  significantly
    limits the alternative funding options of expensive innovative drugs.
  • Secondly, the Chinese national healthcare system remains the biggest payer
    in China and has unparalleled bargaining power due to its huge population
    base and centralised commissioning process. Biogen has experienced first-
    hand that NRDL inclusion is the only pathway to a successful patient access
    in China, and it is willing to exchange price for volume.


However, there are  two hurdles  Spinraza that needs to consider in order for a
successful patient access. The first hurdle is the under-diagnosis of SMA in China.
Based on the published reimbursement price, annual treatment of Spinraza would
cost CNY200k in the first year and CNY100k in the following years (19). If Biogen
could access all 30 thousand patients with SMA, China could potentially generate a
revenue of CNY860 M in 2022 and CNY430 M from 2023 onwards until patent
expiry/end of exclusivity (22).  However, due to the rare nature of SMA, it is often
mistaken for lesser diseases, causing major diagnosis delays or misdiagnosis for
patients worldwide (23). In addition, the wide genetic variations and different onsets
seen in SMA necessitate genetic screening for proper diagnosis (24). Such assays
are only commissioned at comprehensive medical facilities concentrated in major
Chinese cities, which makes diagnosis in rural areas extraordinarily challenging.
China hasn’t disclosed any specific data of SMA diagnosis rates; however, we could
gather an inkling of the issue through data published by the biggest Chinese SMA
foundation, Meier Advocacy & Support Centre. By May 2021, there were only 2,000
registered  patients at the foundation, which is less than a tenth of the "30k SMA
cases" estimated by clinicians/government officials (25). Therefore, it is imperative for
Biogen to raise awareness of SMA and increase diagnosis/treatment rates in order
to   fully   tap   the   Chinese   market.   Considering   additional   post-reimbursement
challenges such as logistics and regional tendering, Spinraza still has a long road to
go.


The second hurdle for Spinraza is its global pricing. It is unclear how many countries
use China for international price referencing, but the drastic 95% price cut will
inevitably   affect   Spinraza’s   pricing   power   elsewhere.   In   upcoming   negotiations,
payers will focus on Spinraza's Chinese price to push for a bigger discount. Although
it is unlikely that other markets could reproduce Spinraza's discount in China, a
bigger than usual discount is expected from Biogen's side, especially in markets
where pharmaco-economic evaluation is not as stringent.


With that being said, Biogen has gained the unparalleled competitive advantage of
government reimbursement in China, and nobody can take that away from them. In
front of its SMA drug, rivals are nothing but a boarding pass to a bitter price war or a
waiver of competition. It is foreseeable that Spinraza will quickly take most of the
serviceable obtainable market in China and generate a stable stream of income for
Biogen, if no further challenges arise. And let us look at the bright side of the story
here: Biogen will give tens of thousands of SMA patients in China a second chance
at life, regardless of its motivation.

So, what do YOU think, was the price drop desperate, or pre-empted?

References

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